Copyright Collecting Societies, Monopolistic Positions and Competition in the Eu Single Market by Riccio, Giovanni Maria & Codiglione, Giorgio Giannone
G. M. Riccio, G. Codiglione: Copyright Collecting Societies ... 287
COPYRIGHT COLLECTING SOCIETIES, 
MONOPOLISTIC POSITIONS AND COMPETITION 
IN THE EU SINGLE MARKET*
by
GIOVANNI MARIA RICCIO** AND GIORGIO 
GIANNONE CODIGLIONE***
The paper will discuss the reform of  the legal framework in the light of the EU  
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the Italian situation, where, like in Austria, there is a legal monopoly. The basis of  
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will  take  into  account  the  relations  between  the  CISAC  decision  and  the  EU  
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the  final  view  is  that  the  overcoming  the  legal  monopoly  is  likely  to  lead  to  
partitioning  of  the  markets  which  will  have  the  result  of,  on  the  one  hand,  
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1. THE ITALIAN FRAMEWORK ON COLLECTING SOCIETIES: 
S.I.A.E. AND LEGAL MONOPOLY
The S.I.A.E. (Italian Society of Authors and Editors) was founded in 1882 
also from an input of some famous artists like Giuseppe Verdi.  From 1921 
SIAE obtained by governmental convention, the power of assessment and 
collection of fees: such fees, in force until 1999, initially related only to plays, 
were  soon  extended  to  other  representations  (e.g.  concerts).
Beyond these historical records, more interesting is the profile concerning 
the legal entity of SIAE. In fact initially SIAE was formed (under articles 2 
and 15 of its first statute) as an association under private law, with a sort of 
mutual mold, disciplined by the companies’ rules of the Italian Civil Code 
of 1865.
 With the adoption of law no. 633 of 1941 (Italian copyright law), and the 
transformation from SIAE to EIDA, it was formally recognized as a public 
law body, confirming the decisions of the Supreme Court which, already in 
the  thirties,  had  stated  that  SIAE  was  a  public  juridical  person,  which 
pursues superindividual purposes and it is subject to a public control.
Therefore SIAE generally works as a monopolistic (or exclusivist) soci-
ety, that manages only copyrights thanks to a legal exclusive. In fact, other 
activities or secondary proprietary rights (like fair compensation for private 
copying), are managed by IMAIE, the other Italian CCS1.
The Italian system is  ruled by paragraph 180 of the Italian copyright 
law2,  which  specifies  that  SIAE  must  work  in  a  situation  of  substantial 
monopoly, justified by law referring to a “general and public interest exi-
gence”. This circumstance has been widely denied by the jurisprudence of 
European Justice Court, first with  BRT versus SABAM sentence, where it 
was denied that CCSs functions can be ascribed to the notion of “general 
economic interest’s service”3.
1 MAIE (Mutualistic Institute of Artist, Interpeters and Performers), was founded in 1977 on 
the initiative of the three main trade unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL), in order to facilitate the 
recognition  of  the  rights  of  performers  and users  and to  obtain  the distribution  of  fair 
compensation related to the reuse or reproduction of works interpreted in any way (radio,  
television, public buildings, etc.).
2 «The right to act as an intermediary in any manner whether by direct or indirect interven-
tion, mediation, agency or representation, or by assignment of the exercise of the rights of  
performance, recitation, broadcasting, including communication to the public by satellite,  
and mechanical and cinematographic reproduction of protected works, shall belong exclus-
ively to the S.I.A.E.».
3 ECJ, Case 127/73 BRT v. SABAM,  [1974], ECR 313.
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Italian copyright law also prescribes that users may generally choose  to 
accept the intermediation made by SIAE or, in alternative, manage by them-
selves their copyrights. 
Actually Italian CCS have the power to influence authors that is those 
who are in a monopolistic position: in a recent sentence, the Italian Consti-
tutional  Court  said  that  SIAE  manages  authors’ rights  «in  conditions  of 
substantial  monopoly, as to give the power to influence the users and the 
market that it is own as monopolist. This qualification of the phenomenon, 
moreover,  is consistent with the notion of monopoly elaborated  from the 
modern doctrine,  which defines it «as the exclusive of  offering goods and 
services that are not easily replaceable by the average user»4.
In a more specific analysis, the Italian situation is like a “perfect (or abso-
lute)  monopoly”,  where  the  national  law  denies  other  societies  to  give 
identical services5.
In perfect monopoly a subject owns 100% of the market share and can 
not have competitors, due to intervention by the State which prohibits an 
indirect competition. 
In fact in Italian systems (like in Austria) national law prohibits the pro-
vision of an identical service and there are no alternatives. Paragraph 180 of 
Italian copyright law saves intermediation activity only for SIAE: the para-
dox is that rightholders may, theoretically, directly collect the incomes from 
the exploitation of their works but this does not change the real asset. 
Perfect monopoly or - to be more precise - absolute monopoly has, there-
fore, a prerequisite for State intervention. The State limits the intervention of 
other parties and does not allow competitive services.
2. OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES: NATURAL MONOPOLIES 
Differently  from  Italy,  in  several  European  countries  there  are  “natural 
monopolies”, based on the fact that law does not deny the access of other 
competitors, but the access in this market was equally very difficult, due to 
the creation of economies of scales or to the high fixed costs. 
Therefore, in the actual context, CCSs approach to create natural mono-
polies, because they determine a reduction of transactive costs that deny the 
access of new competitors in the market.
4 Corte Costituzionale, n. 241/1990, Foro italiano, 1990, I, c. 2401.
5 GOYDER, D.G. (2003), EC Competition Law, 4th ed., Oxford Univ. Press, 9.
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In the case of copyright,  however,  two singularities must be taken into 
consideration.
First  of  all,  that  is  a  subject with a  big  transfrontier  aim,  while  offering 
similar services for the entire European Union, it allows every single CCS to 
operate outside their  own national  context. In  fact,  every  CCS has a 
sufficient expertise to offer equivalent and coincident performance with the 
other competitors.  Therefore, the possible fall of legal monopolies would 
allow entities who are already operating elsewhere, to expand its operation 
area, circumventing the matter of initial fixed costs6.
The  second  aspect  concerns the  unclear  nature of  intermediation 
societies. It is known that the main benefits of competition are represented 
by offering better  goods or services (most technologically advanced)  and 
reducing their cost (and, prices). In the case of CCs, beneficiaries of this type 
of  competition are two distinct  categories of  subjects.  On one hand,  the 
rightholders,  who  are  not  necessarily  members  of  CCs. Market 
liberalization would determine, first, a  reduction of registration fees and 
also of costs connected to other ancillary services held by monopolists.
On the other hand, we must also consider “user’s benefits”, or – in other 
words  –  benefits  of  an  individual  «who is  carrying out  acts  subject  to  the  
authorisation of rightholders, the remuneration of rightholders or the payment of  
compensation to rightholders and who is not acting in the capacity of a consumer»7. 
In this case, the competition between different intermediation societies 
allows lower costs and market diversification. An aspect often neglected is 
related to the type of exploitation of works.  With reference to the music 
industry, e.g.,  copyrighted works may be considered central elements (from 
a commercial perspective),  but at the same time accessory (as in the case of 
muzzak8). 
6 RICCIO, G.M. (2012), Copyright collecting societies e regole di concorrenza.  Un’indagine 
comparatistica, Torino, Giappichelli editore, 57.
7 Art. 3, par. 1, i), of the Proposal for a “Directive of the European Parliament and of the  
Council” on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial li-
censing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market,  (COM(2012) 372 
final).  It is, to be more explicit, radios, televisions, pubs, clubs that use under a license the 
works that belongs to the CCS’s repertoire.
8 Elevator music (also known as Muzzak, piped music, weather music or lift music) refers to 
instrumental arrangements of popular music designed for playing in shopping malls, gro-
cery stores, department stores, telephone systems (while the caller is on hold), cruise ships, 
airports, business offices, and  elevators. The term is also frequently applied as a generic 
term for any form of easy listening, smooth jazz, or middle of the road music, or to the type 
of recordings commonly heard on "beautiful music" radio stations (from Wikipedia).
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Generally, CCSs issue all-inclusive licenses, like “license packages”: it is 
clear,  however,  that  users  could  be  interested  in  acquiring  different 
repertoires  that  are  cheaper  (and  also  with  less  commercial  appeal).  Is 
evident that consumers do not go to a particular shop to buy muzzak, but are 
driven by other factors9.
The  current  trend  seems  to  push  straight  for  the  repeal  of  existing 
monopolies and for the enlargement of the  workability beyond traditional 
national limits. It is an approach  more easily adequate in those systems - 
such  as England - where there are no legislative limits to  market opening 
and also to a system moving to competition, at least in oligopolistic terms.
3. CENTRALIZED AND MONOPOLISTIC COPYRIGHT 
MANAGEMENT IN A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE 
From a Law and Economics perspective we can recognize some “classical” 
issues adduced to justify the subsistence of monopolistic positions (legal or 
natural) in CCSs system:
a) Collecting  societies  guarantee  economical  efficiency  due  to  a 
centralized copyright management10. On the other hand, individual 
management  may  be  difficult  or  non-economical  sustainable. 
Without these bodies individual management and intermediation 
would in fact be impossible (or not economically advantageous) for 
authors. At the same time, complications may be hit on attempting 
to obtain individual licenses. CCs ensure that "centralized" subjects 
- acting in the name and on behalf of authors and other rightholders 
- can have the direct contractual relationship (and, therefore, benefit 
schemes) with those who exploit the works.
b) Another  aspect  is  represented  by  the wide  range  of  rights 
recognized  by  the legislation  on  copyright and  the connected 
problem  of  managing with potential  users  a  unified and 
comprehensive  coverage  of various rights.  The  situation is  even 
more complex considering that authors’ individual rights are inde-
pendent from each other (and, therefore, in theory capable of separ-
ate  and  free acts  of  disposition)  and  that  required  licenses  may 
9 Very interesting is the experience of English society SoundReef,  also very active in Italy 
following the CISAC decision, which offers  licensing costs significantly lower than those 
proposed by SIAE and SCF.
10 HANDKE, C. – TOWSE, R. (2007), Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies, 38 Int. Rev.  
of Intell. Prop. and Competition Law, 937. 
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change according to the type of transmission or distribution used, 
and  also  depending  on  the considered  geographic  market. 
Likewise,  individual  negotiation between rightholders  and users 
would be inefficient especially  for  works not widely  distributed, 
where transaction costs generally outweigh the potential economic 
benefits11.
c) Another important aspect is that CCSs work only in one nation 
or in a well defined territorial context, where competition is not al-
lowed. In fact, when there is no “ex lege” monopoly, any CCSs born 
after the first one tend to place oneself in other areas, avoiding any 
form of competition (and also high transaction costs), preferring to 
specialize in different – often “niche” - protected rights areas (like in 
the English system). 
d) Monopoly also avoids risks connected to copyright management 
that  involves  both rightholders and users12. Without collective 
management  in  fact  they  have  to  face  risk  linked  to two  main 
information asymmetries. First of all the market’s lack of knowledge 
and the elasticity of demand, intended as the variation in demand 
from the users of a product (in this case,  of a protected work)  in 
case  of percentage  variation  of  the product’s  price13.  The  second 
asymmetry is  represented by parties’ knowledge  (e.g.  the users), 
and the bargaining power, which penalizes rightholders compared 
to bodies such as radios, televisions, record labels, whose market 
position has strengthened over time. Finally, the last is  the relative 
risk  of non-payment of  royalties and  the  individual  inability  to 
monitor efficiently their works (e.g. infringements).
The greatest risk for users is also going through individual negotiation 
with authors. It is evident that they tend to overestimate their position and 
commercial value of their work, due to the lack of market knowledge in 
which  they  work14.  A  final  advantage  of  collective  and  monopolistic 
11 HOLLANDER, A. (1984), Market Structure and Performance in Intellectual Property: The 
Case of Copyright Collectives, 2 Intern. J. of Industrial Organization, 199.
12 PÉREZ GÓMEZ TÉTREL, A.M. (2007), Efficient Allocation of Risk as an Economic Function 
of Collecting Societies, Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues. Annual Congress, Ber-
lin, 12 and 13 July 2007, 3; KATZ, A. (2005), The Potential Demise of Another Natural Mono-
poly: Rethinking the Collective Administration of Performing Rights, in Journal of Competi-
tion Law & Economics, 541.
13 WALRAS, L. (1926), Elements d’economie politique pure ou Théorie de la richesse sociale, 
Lousanne.
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management, is the competence to simply identify rightholders,  avoiding 
risk of entering in agreements with wrong persons.
For these reasons it seems difficult to overcome the dogma of a central-
ized collective management. 
On the other  hand,  the most  outstanding inefficiencies that  come out 
from the analysis  of  monopolistic  positions -  like in  the Italian system - 
concern the role of management and administration costs of CCSs.
This is a remarkable profile, which should be not only a starting point in 
any study on the topic, but also a good test practical conclusions.
The  incomes  that  companies  distribute  to  their  members  may  be 
summarized in general with the following formula:
R = P - C – F 
where R is the total value of the proceeds collected from the exploitation of 
repertoire’s works, P is the total amount distributed to CCS’ members, C are 
the costs, F the funds distributed for cultural and social activities. 
In this formula we must consider two more aspects: their membership 
size (indicated by M) - which is a variable that can impact both positively 
and negatively with R, depending on the actual capacity of these subjects to 
generate income - and the number of employees of the collecting societies 
(indicated by E) 15
Furthermore,  it  should be  noted that  M (in  a  general  sense,  but  also 
understood as individual members’ bargaining power) is  a variable with 
direct impact on C.
It has recently been demonstrated (in relation to the French model), that 
in  big  CCS   models  the  control  done  by  members  over  administrative 
management is more complex. 
On the  contrary  in  small  CCSs there is  a  greater  social  participation, 
reflected also in terms of cost containment. Similarly, the presence of strong 
market power members, determines the most efficient solutions  for those 
who manage CCSs,  which drift  towards more efficient and cost-effective 
solutions16. The costs of collective management must be considered not only 
14 GREFFE, X. (2002), Arts and Artists from an Economic Perspective, Paris, p. 99, who de-
scribes artist as «isolated persons (in relation with the market), know really bad the possibil-
ities of the enhanced value in the future of their works».
15 See ROCHELANDET, F. (2003), Are Copyright Collecting Societies Efficient Organisation? 
An Evaluation of Collective Administration of Copyright in Europe,  in  The Economics of  
Copyright. Developments in Research and Analysis, W.J. Gordon – R. Watt (eds.), Cheltenham, 
UK – Northampton, MA, USA, 182.
16 See ROCHELANDET, F. (2001), La mise en oeuvre collective des droits d’auteur: une évalu-
ation, in Réseaux, n. 110, 93.
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in a theoretical way, but mainly in practice17. For example, with reference to 
the Italian experience, surely it should be stated that the monopoly is not an 
efficient solution for collecting societies. In fact, the SIAE was administered, 
over  the years,  according to a logic of  mere political  division (or family 
interests),  without taking into  any account the need to pursue minimum 
standards of administrative safety18. 
4. INEFFICIENCES AND SOLUTIONS 
The Law and Economics literature has proposed three solutions to solve po-
tential monopolies inefficiencies in copyright and connected rights manage-
ment market:
a) Legislative  control.  Through the  first  model,  it  is  possible  to 
check royalties paid to rightholders, which can be fixed by law or 
subject to a next judicial review in order to assess any abuses in the 
distribution of collected proceeds. Examples for this model can be 
found:  a) in the contract obligations (e.g. obligation to register all 
rightholders who make a request,  like in SIAE. model);  b) setting 
obligation to guarantee equal treatment to all members;  c) users’ li-
cences supervision made by higher authorities, in order to prevent 
any abuse (e.g. Intellectual Property Office and Copyright Tribunal 
control on the licenses issued by  British CCSs).
b) Bilateral Monopoly.  The bilateral monopoly is achieved when 
one CCS counterpart is represented by another CCS or by any other 
body which manages copyright collectively. This is what happened 
in Italy, with IMAIE - the body that represents the actors and per-
formers - and SIAE, or the same situation occurred in the past in 
United Kingdom with the  links between BBC and PRS.  In  these 
cases, CCS’ strength is balanced by the bargaining power of the oth-
er party, who is  able to strive for profit  and utility maximization 
(also for its members), radically reducing the problem of asymmet-
ric information. Another example are, of the agreements concluded 
at the international level by individual collecting societies belonging 
to CISAC or BIEM,  theoretical in a position of equality between 
17 PATRY, W. (2012), How to fix Copyright, Oxford University press, 181: «Collecting societies 
can exercise disproportionate leverage against smaller licences; they can be administratively 
inefficient and sometimes even corrupt; they can favour national right holders over foreign 
ones; they can retain royalties for a long time in order to “float” interest payments; and they 
can make very bad investments».
18 For example, only in 2008 S.I.A.E. lost 40 million euros in investments in Lehman Brothers.
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them: there are no agreements negotiated between individual com-
panies, but also understanding imposed by the bodies which they 
belong to, that  determine the problem of uncompetition restrictive 
agreements between CCSs or a strong supervision carried out by in-
ternational bodies. 
c) Price  Discrimination.  Some  scholars  suggest  to  implement 
price  discrimination  with  the  purpose  to  mitigate  monopoly 
negative  effects.  Some  indicators  are  commonly  adopted  by  the 
European  CCSs  (mainly  referred  to  clubs),  like  licensing  costs 
parameterized on room size or on the turnout. Price discrimination 
has another variant. Users of protected works are maybe different 
interest  carriers:  some  economists  argue  the  need  for  market-
sharing mechanism using a pay-per-use basis, taking into account 
the capacity assets and interest  of  potential  users,  dividing them 
into  different  categories. Another  solution  would be   separated 
marketing  of “repertoires  packages”,  instead of  a  single license 
which  covers  all the  CCSs’ repertoire  (e.g.  licenses  designed  for 
individual authors or dedicated to a clear musical genre). Carrying 
out a competitive logic will open the market door to new players, 
offering  different repertoires (with  artists often  less  known than 
those protected by big CCSs)  and cheaper licensing costs. Finally 
the absence of monopoly should also enable consumers to benefit 
indirectly of the decrease in copyrighted works prices.
5. THE CISAC ANTITRUST DECISION 
On  16th  July  2008,  the  European  Commission  issued  a  decision  in  the 
CISAC case19,  concerning the conditions of management and licensing of 
authors’ public performance rights of musical works by collecting societies. 
It was addressed to the authors' collecting societies established in the EEA 
which are members of the International Confederation of Societies of Au-
thors and Composers ("CISAC").
CISAC  is  a  non-governmental,  non-profit  making  organisation  re-
gistered under French law and has legal personality, it represents 219 mem-
ber societies in 115 countries. One of the major objectives of CISAC is to 
19 European Commission, 16.07.2008, Case COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC. See e.g. ANDRIES, A. – 
JULIEN-MALVY,  B.  (2008),  The  CISAC  decision  —  creating  competition  between  collecting  
societies for music rights, in Competition policy newsletter, 3, 53.
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promote reciprocal representation among collecting societies by means of 
model contracts.
The investigations carried out by the Commission has focused mainly on 
the structure and terms of the standard contract used by CISAC as a "mod-
el"  to  put  in  place “reciprocal  representation  agreements”   between the 
member societies.
The system of “reciprocal representation agreements” allows each col-
lecting society, through a global mutual cooperation network, to collect at 
the same time royalties due as a result of exploitation of the rights in its own 
country, not only for its own members, but also for the authors and publish-
ers abroad who are members of other CCSs with which it has concluded bi-
lateral representation agreements.
The CISAC model contract was approved for the first time at the CISAC 
general assembly in 1936.
It serves as a non-mandatory model for reciprocal representation agree-
ments between CISAC members, especially for the licensing of public per-
formance rights.
Collective  management  of  copyright  covers  different  activities  corres-
ponding to many different relevant product markets which were all affected 
by the CISAC model contract20:
a) the  provision  of  copyright  administration  services  to 
rightholders;
b) the provision of copyright administration services to other 
collecting societies;
c) The licensing of public performance rights for satellite, cable 
and internet transmissions to commercial users.
Each collecting society in the EEA had signed a reciprocal representation 
agreement based on the CISAC model contract with all other EEA CISAC 
members, creating in this way a “web system” that allows each CCS to li-
cense not only the repertoire of their own members but also the repertoire 
of all associated collecting societies (this complete repertoire is hereinafter 
referred to as the "world repertoire" even though some collecting societies 
would occasionally not participate in the system). 
Specifically, the Commission focused on certain restrictions contained in 
the CISAC model contract:
20 See  the  EU  Commission  Decisions   Sony/BMG,  19.07.2004  (Case  no.  M.3333)  and 
Seagram/Polygram, 21.11.1998 (Case no. IV/M.1219).
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a) membership restrictions contained in  the  reciprocal 
representation  agreements  which  prevent  competition 
between EEA CISAC members for the provision of their 
services to authors (“membership clauses”)21;
b) territorial  restrictions  which  prevent  competition 
between EEA CISAC members for the licensing of per-
forming rights to commercial users; the territorial restric-
tions take the form of express exclusivities in the recip-
rocal representation agreements and a concerted practice 
on the territorial delineation of the scope of the licence 
(“territorial clauses”)22.
The Commission also noted that the presence of “liming clauses” in all 
the reciprocal agreements, was not the result of normal competitive condi-
tions. In fact, these clauses were based on the CISAC model contract, limit-
ing all the CCSs to uniformly define the relevant territory as the domestic 
territory of the respective collecting society. Therefore, says the Commis-
sion, these clauses «cannot simply be explained by autonomous behaviour promp-
ted by market forces», but consitued a concerted practice for these reasons:
a) the practice of the 24 EEA CISAC members cannot be 
justified by legislative provisions;
b) the "Sydney Agreement", raised my members in 1987, 
is not an appropriate answer to the objections;
c) the practice cannot be said to be the outcome of indi-
vidual market reaction23.
21 Article 11(II), CISAC model contract (provided until june 2004): “While this contract is in 
force neither of the contracting Societies may, without the consent of the other, accept as a 
member any member of the other society or any natural person, firm or company having 
the nationality of one of the countries in which the other Society operates.”
22 Article 1(I), CISAC model contract (provided until may 1996):“By virtue of the present con-
tract, the SODIX confers on the SODAY the exclusive right, in the territories in which the 
latter Society operates (as they are defined and delimited in Article 6(1) hereafter), to grant 
the necessary authorisations for all public performances (as defined in paragraph III of this  
Article) of musical works, with or without lyrics, which are protected under the terms of na-
tional laws, bilateral treaties and multilateral international conventions relating to the au-
thor’s right (copyright, intellectual property, etc…) now in existence or which may come 
into existence and enter into effect while the present contract is in force. The exclusive right 
referred to in the preceding paragraph is conferred insofar as the public performance right 
in the works concerned has been, or shall be, during the period when the present contract is 
in force, assigned, transferred or granted by whatever means, for the purpose of its admin-
istration, to the SODIX by its members, in accordance with its Articles of Association and 
Rules the said works collectively constituting “the repertoire of the SODIX”.
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«The uniform territorial delineation», said also the Commission, «has the ef-
fect of indirectly granting exclusivity insofar as it standardises the reciprocal rep-
resentation between the EEA CISAC members». 
The Commission concluded that this concerted practice restricts compet-
ition within the meaning of Article 81(1) of the Treaty and Article 53(1) of 
the EEA Agreement, «since it prevents EEA CISAC members from choosing col-
lecting societies, other than the domestic one, for the licensing of their repertoires  
abroad». However, on April 12, the General Court has annulled the first in-
stance decision in respect of the finding of the concerted practice (i.e. the 
cartel created among the collecting societies), as long as the Commission has 
not provided a sufficient evidence to support its position.
6. THE EU DIRECTIVE DRAFT 
In this frame the EU directive draft, licensed by the European Commission 
on July, gives some important aims:
a) wider  frontiers and permit to other CCS to establish in other 
European countries;
b) give Authors freedom of choosing which CCS offers more ad-
vantageous conditions and also negotiating works packets, without 
the duty of negotiating with the CCS who works in your own territ-
ory;
c) harmony and uniformity in governance, requirements and guar-
antees. Duty of transparence in the relationships with users and au-
thors;
d) growth of a multi-territorial licensing system (especially for on-
line networks);
e) obligatoriness of  a  controlling Authority (only for private and 
public big CCSs);
f) fair and diligent profits management;
23 «It cannot be assumed that the parallel behaviour is the outcome of individual market ac-
tion.  Every  collecting society needs  to  have a  reciprocal  representation  agreement  with 
every other collecting society if it wants to gather all available repertoires and offer a mul-
ti-repertoire licence. However, this equal exchange of repertoires should not prevent collect-
ing societies from granting their rights to more than one collecting society for the same ter -
ritory. GEMA could, for example, have a reciprocal representation agreement with SACEM 
and with SABAM in order to get in exchange the French, as well as the Belgian rights, for 
exploitation in Germany. This would not prevent GEMA from granting the German rights 
for the combined territories of Belgium and France to both collecting societies thereby al-
lowing for competition between them». 
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g) duties of transparency and financial statement24.
It is indisputable that there will be an un-statualization (????) of CCSs, 
who, abandoned the national borders, are projected to a global market (or at 
least European). 
The  comparison  with potential  competitors should  encourage better 
management  practices or  the  adoption  of more  advanced technological 
standards.
Speaking about the critical aspects of the Directive draft, we can recog-
nize some issues like:
a) failure to introduce new form of negotiation, n the light of pre-
venting negative effects linked to the subscription of contracts in set 
form;
b) the proposal  widens correctly the duties of information but  it 
doesn’t provide for a general right of withdrawal. 
From a different perspective there will be the risk of a passage from a 
mutual and  solidarity copyright management conception  to a mercantilist 
vision.  The question is in terms of dualistic opposition between solidarity 
and efficiency. On one hand, there would be the need to protect the weakest 
rightholders, those who are less able to broadcast their works, and, on the 
other  hand there is  the need to offer more  profitable and “economically 
efficient” services.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In the debate between solidaristic instances25 and free market criteria prob-
ably a third way exists represented by private freedom tempered by a su-
perior, public law, supervision26.
In  fact,  the  market  opening process  may increase  majors’ commercial 
power,  that  could manage bigger  and enormous musical  repertories,  in-
creasing also their own contractual power, passing from a “collecting societ-
ies monopoly” to a “major right owners monopoly”.
24 For example as suggested from some scholars, requiring ISO-standards also for rigts man-
agement systems. PATRY, W. (2012), How to fix Copyright, 183.
25 See  WALLIS, R. – BADEN-FULLER, C. – KRETSCHMER, K. –KLIMIS, G.M. (1999), Con-
tested Collective Administration of Intellectual Property Rights in Music: The challenge to 
the principles of Reciprocity and Solidarity, in 14 European Journal of Communication, 5 and 
MACMILLAN, F. (2006), Cultural Diversity in an Era of Corporate Dominance: A Clash of 
Rights?, DIME Conference on Intellectual Property Rights for Business and Society Birk-
beck, University of London, 15-16 September 2006, 8.
26 FALCE, V. (2012), Gestione dei diritti, disintermediazione e Collecting Societies. La modern-
izzazione del diritto d’autore, AIDA, Milano, Giuffrè editore.
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The other risk is connected to the possibility that the gap between small 
and big CCSs could become greater. 
Under the terms of competition, there is a further risk. The large CCSs, 
especially English ones, may impose exclusive contracts to individual users, 
in  order  to  let  them use  only  their own  repertoires. Finally, the  market 
globalization encourages and facilitates the  creation of dominant  market 
positions,  reducing  fixed  costs associated with  establishment  and 
management  of  any branch  offices,  and  allowing  also  from  remote  the 
pursuit of certain activities.
On the other hand, following the experience of some European countries 
(like  United Kingdom),  liberalization  does not  necessarily  determine  the 
erasing of small CCSs by the bigger ones. On the contrary, the competition 
between  various  CCSs  develops  technical  specialization  or,  in  copyright 
market case, probably a specialization in specific work sectors, often neg-
lected by big operators (because considered not profitable27). 
The Directive, breaking  down  national  boundaries and  opening  the 
market,  may  be  also  prejudicial  to medium-sized  companies,  in  which 
management inefficiencies are more widespread. The opposite result should 
induce CCSs to have to deal with the logic of competition, improving their 
administration and reducing costs.
Finally, another important aspect is connected to the possibility that the 
liberalization could be circumvented at the national level when it is object of 
transposition  by  the  member  states,  for  example  imposing  certain  law 
standards for CCSs.
Coming back to the Italian frame for example, recently the Government 
has made public the draft on “Minimal requirements necessary for a correct 
development  of  secondary  rights  connected  to  copyright  intermediaries 
market”. 
Reading the text of the proposal we can recognize positive elements (like 
the provision of a minimum number of employees, as in the Portuguese ex-
perience) but, on the other hand, the choice of imposing a minimum finan-
cial estate, that could penalize new operators who are trying to access in the 
market, is rather perplexing. Following this example, the risk also for the 
other European countries, will be to follow an “incomplete” liberalization, 
27 On the contrary Other scholars argue that «the numbers and the duties of societies must be 
dramatically reduced per country, with no more than one per right, per type of work, and 
preferably with one per type of work». PATRY, W. (2012), How to fix Copyright, 182.
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“changing” the already existing legal frames, with a formal (and not sub-
stantial) transposition28.
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